There are cycles in the global economy in which geology returns to politics. We are in one of those moments. The reordering of global supply chains around rare earths and critical minerals is not a technological phenomenon. It is a reconfiguration of the material conditions of power that will structure the next generation of strategic industries. Mozambique positions itself in this arena with a rare combination: favorable geology, a coastal location, ongoing projects, and an open political window, all at the same time. The question is not whether the country has resources. The question is whether it will be able, in the next seven to ten years, to transform them into industrial capacity before that window closes.
I. The Global Chessboard: From Chemistry to Coercion
The category “rare earths” comprises 17 chemical elements: the 15 lanthanides, plus scandium and yttrium. The term is, strictly speaking, misleading: these elements are not particularly rare in terms of abundance in the Earth’s crust. What is rare is finding them in economically exploitable concentrations and, above all, having the industrial infrastructure capable of separating, refining, and converting them into usable end products. It is in this second dimension—industrial chemistry—that the true power of the sector lies today. And here, China has no rival.
The data is unequivocal and must be stated plainly. China accounts for approximately 60% of global rare earth extraction and more than 90% of global refining capacity. When the concept is broadened to the wider category of critical minerals, the International Energy Agency documents that China is the dominant refiner in 19 of the 20 minerals it analyzes, with an average market share of around 70%. For specific components such as neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets, purified phosphoric acid for lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, or high-purity manganese sulfate, concentration exceeds 90%. This is not a circumstantial monopoly. It is the result of four decades of deliberate industrial policy, executed with a long-term horizon that no Western democracy has, to date, been able to match.
The year 2025 inaugurated a qualitatively new phase in this architecture. In April, Beijing imposed mandatory licensing on exports of seven rare earths and their derivatives. In October, through Notice No. 61 of the Ministry of Commerce, the regime tightened further, adding five new elements (holmium, erbium, thulium, europium, and ytterbium), and introducing an extraterritorial principle. Control now extends to products manufactured outside China that contain Chinese material or technology above 0.1%. This last element, often underanalyzed in public commentary, is the most significant. It means the control system has moved beyond a border measure and has become a global jurisdictional architecture over entire value chains.
On November 7, 2025, within the framework of the Xi–Trump meeting in Busan, China temporarily suspended (for 12 months, until November 2026) the application of these additional controls, in exchange for the equivalent suspension of the U.S. “Affiliates Rule.” This suspension should not be mistaken for a return to the status quo. The April 2025 restrictions remain in force, the licensing system remains in place, and on March 31, 2026, the State Council issued Order No. 834 on the Provisions on the Security of Industrial and Supply Chains, integrating export controls, data security, investment screening, and compliance obligations into a unified framework applicable to all companies operating under Chinese jurisdiction. What is being observed is not a trade conflict. It is the consolidation of a regime of industrial governance with extraterritorial reach.
“When talking about rare earths and critical minerals, the public tends to associate them with electric vehicles and batteries. This association is correct, but insufficient.”
The Western response has been coherent in its objectives and fragmented in its instruments. In January 2026, a G7 ministerial meeting in Washington placed rare earths at the top of the agenda, discussing minimum price mechanisms and coordinated incentives to reduce dependency. In March 2026, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced the conversion of part of its debt in Syrah Resources—which operates the Balama graphite mine in Cabo Delgado—into equity, complemented by a convertible instrument. This is an unprecedented operation: it is the first time the DFC has acquired a convertible loan note in a listed company. In the United States, the Pentagon consolidated, in 2025, its position as the main institutional investor in MP Materials, the only vertically integrated producer of rare earth magnets on U.S. soil. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) confirmed, in March 2026, formal support for the Monte Muambe project in Tete. In parallel, Beijing formalized, in April 2026, during President Daniel Chapo’s state visit to China, a comprehensive agreement including geological mapping of northern Mozambique, security cooperation, and investment in processing infrastructure.
There is, therefore, an ongoing race. And Mozambique is simultaneously positioned in three arenas: as a potential supplier for Western diversification chains, as a node in China’s industrial network, and as a sovereign jurisdiction that has not yet consolidated its doctrine in relation to this dual courtship.
II. Minerals as the Invisible Infrastructure of the 21st-Century Economy
It is important to correct a misconception. When people talk about rare earths and critical minerals, they tend to associate them primarily with electric vehicles and batteries. This association is correct, but insufficient. The real centrality of these materials lies in the fact that they constitute the essential physical infrastructure of virtually all technological frontiers that will define the next phase of the global economy.
Neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets, “doped” with dysprosium and terbium, are the component that makes high-energy-density electric motors possible. They are in every electric vehicle, every offshore wind turbine, every military drone, every guided missile, and every satellite navigation system. A single F-35 fighter jet contains approximately 417 kg of rare earths and derivatives, according to the Congressional Research Service. A 3 MW offshore wind turbine with a direct-drive permanent magnet generator may require around 600 kg of neodymium. There is currently no industrially scalable alternative to these magnets, and this absence of substitution is, in itself, the source of Beijing’s geopolitical leverage.
In electrification, natural graphite occupies an even more underestimated structural position. It is the dominant material for lithium-ion battery anodes, representing between 95% and 98% of anode mass in almost all commercial chemistries. Synthetic graphite, derived from petroleum coke, offers superior performance but at an energy and environmental cost three times higher than that of natural graphite. China refines around 90% of natural graphite transformed into active anode material (AAM). In this context, ownership of the Balama mine by an Australian operator financed by the United States becomes a first-order strategic asset—not because of absolute scale, but because of its position outside the Chinese architecture.
Lithium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese complete the quartet defining battery chemistry. But the game is becoming more differentiated. LFP batteries already account for about half of the electric vehicle market, and their expansion concentrates dependence on purified phosphorus and high-purity manganese—two inputs in which China controls 75% and 95% of global capacity, respectively. Emerging sodium-ion chemistries shift the geography of dependence but do not eliminate it. The chemical chessboard remains, under any scenario, dominated by a single player.
Finally, there is the defense and semiconductor dimension, often excluded from public debate but decisive in strategic state agendas. Gallium and germanium, which are formally not classified as rare earths but are often grouped within this universe, are essential in compound semiconductors, lasers, night vision systems, and advanced radar. Tantalum, of which Mozambique may possess the world’s largest reserve, is a critical capacitor in high-performance microelectronics. Titanium, with significant reserves in the Moma deposit, is structural for the aerospace and medical implant sectors.
These are not minerals. They are the invisible ingredients without which there are no airplanes, phones, 5G networks, satellites, missile systems, or practically any advanced medical or industrial equipment.
The scale of projected demand growth is itself geopolitically asymmetric. The International Energy Agency estimates that global demand for critical minerals must triple by 2030 and quadruple by 2040 to meet announced climate commitments. Lithium demand will increase fivefold by 2040 in the Stated Policies Scenario. Graphite and nickel will double. Cobalt and rare earths will grow by 50% to 60%. Even in conservative scenarios, the demand curve is structural, not cyclical.
But here is the critical point often overlooked: supply-side discontinuities are profoundly asymmetric. Excluding the largest supplier (typically China), remaining supply would cover only 35% to 40% of projected demand for graphite and rare earths by 2035. This asymmetry is what makes diversification an existential industrial necessity for the West. And it is within this asymmetry that lies the opportunity for jurisdictions such as Mozambique.
[To be continued in the next edition]
